plural action essays in philosophy and social science

Acts of communication, however, are plural actions. 44 Consensus and Commitment. Rather, the specter of the group mind is itself an individualistic artefact that arises from a deep-seated Cartesian preconception concerning the mind, which we should leave behind. But clearly, the order of explanation goes from the individual plural action essays in philosophy and social science to the collective. Those scientific theories and hypotheses, which are supported by facts or experience, are formulated as laws of nature or society. The role of normativity in joint intentional activity. In these cases, the interpretation of these individuals behavior has to bottom out in the respective individuals own (other-directed) pro-attitudes. David Carr, Emory University, GA, USA. The advantage of this model is that it avoids the problem of rational intentional self-confidence by invoking an agent that matches the size of the task in question. Agents can only intend what they take to be their own actions.

Plural, action : Essays in, philosophy and, social

In ordinary language, we xvi Introduction share such things as cars and cakes, and in these cases, sharing seems to imply one (token) cake with many pieces, or one (token) taxi with many passengers. Arational Actions, Journal of Philosophy 88: 5768. This seems the most natural way of putting intention, but this places tight restrictions on the possible objects of intention. Site Directory is updated by users of the public Internet sources and in no way affects the rights of copyright holders. I argue that intentional autonomy does not imply motivational autarky, and that non-autarkical behavior might actually play an important plural action essays in philosophy and social science role in many cases of plural action (this issue is further pursued in Chapter 8 below). Authentication Code: lccopycat, library of Congress Call Number: B105.I56 S35 2009, dewey Decimal Classification Number: 128/.4 22, personal Name: Schmid, Hans Bernhard. So (token) intentions are not literally shared after all. I argue, however, that this resemblance should not be taken as an argument for Lazarus conception, but rather as an argument against our current mainstream thinking about social identity. Sending a man on the moon simply exceeds a single technicians possibilities. I shall call this commitment, which I believe to be at the heart of methodological individualism, the principle of individual intentional autonomy.


In its shortest formulation, the assumption is the following: (B) Individual Intentional Autonomy: Under normal circumstances, each individuals behavior instantiates his or her own actions. As Sens critics have repeatedly pointed out, this claim appears to be nonsensical since even altruistic agents cannot pursue other peoples goals without making them their own. The next chapter addresses an altogether different issue. The development of theoretical thinking and philosophy represent a long process, the conditions of which can be found at early stages of human society. Here, Heideggers insight into the pre-reflexive character of intentional togetherness as developed in the previous chapter is important. 2 Collective Agents and Individual Autonomy. Pure coordination, re-labeled strategies. Intentional zombies abound in philosophical thought experiments (e.g. Defending Heideggers anti-conventionalism against his current pragmatist interpreters, I shall propose 4 It was only after I finished working on this book that I noticed that all chapters on the role of collective intentionality in current social science (Part. This philosophical scrutiny is more urgently felt in sociology than in the natural sciences because of the very nature of sociology.


The question of whether or not we should stick to the rule of basing all intentional interpretations of an individuals behavior on a pro-attitude which we ascribe to that individual herself is ultimately settled by the question of whether. That his or her behavior should.B. Heidegger simply neglects the dimension of cooperation in his depiction of skillful coping. First, some of the main conceptual problems in the received literature are introduced, and a number of new insights into basic questions in the philosophy of collective intentionality are developed (part 1). Not all goals, however, are individual goals; there are shared goals, too. Frankfurt: Ontos 2008,. I argue, first, that the main reason why the assumption of motivational autarky is endorsed is that it is not sufficiently distinguished from intentional autonomy. For the purposes of this chapter, I call this the Participation Theory of Team Agency. Emotions as Evaluative Feelings, Emotion Review 1: 248255. Thus I argue that the fact that some intentional states involve qualitative or phenomenal elements does not speak for an individualistic reading of collective intentionality. It thus tries to interpret and estimate the social phenomena in terms of ethical principles. On this site it is impossible to download the book, read the book online or get the contents of a book.


plural action essays in philosophy and social science

Plural action : essays in philosophy and social science Schmid, Hans

3 The Dogma of Motivational Autarky 17 My claim is that this view is mistaken. In contrast to action theory, common sense seems to have no difficulty whatsoever in coming up with suitable agents for plural actions. Just because each individual in a group has a similar or the same type of goal, or even goals with the same content, does not make the activity in question a plural action. Are there any plausible candidates that conform to the principle of intentional self-confidence objectively rationally (in the sense defined above) with regard to plural actions? I shall argue that it is not, and that the theory of plural agency will make great headway by dropping intentional individualism, and endorsing a stronger conception of intentional commonality. As I shall argue, this rules out a strictly participatory understanding of collective intentionality and team agency of a certain kind. 10 In Donald Davidsons words, R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent toward actions with a certain. Such breakdown could lead to a better appreciation of both, but only if the divide is replaced by a truly transcendental theology. I shall then turn to a somewhat more detailed discussion of each of these models, and examine the reasons why they are met with so much reservation (or even resistance) from the side of action theory. Its role in the social sciences is the study of the fundamental principles and concepts of social life in their epistemological and axiological aspects. 16 1 Plural Action Individual intentional autarky does, of course, not imply that other individuals pro-attitudes can play no role in the interpretation of an individuals behavior. In his 1984 book, and especially in his paper on WeIntention (1988; co-authored with Kaarlo Miller he set the stage for what was to come in the 2 decades that have followed. It might seem that this view is a direct consequence of the intentional autonomy of the participating individuals, but I shall argue that this is mistaken, and that there is a further and more problematic claim involved in this view.


Holistic Epistemology and Action Theory, Heusenstamm: Ontos 2007,. Advertisements: Three Connections between the Two Sciences :. 8 1 Plural Action Wilfrid Sellars (1992: 183ff.) has claimed that propositional intentions are expressions of practical commitments only by virtue of their conceptual tie to action referential intentions. Library of Congress Control Number. To be as explicit on this point as possible: plural actions require more than the participants having similar goals. Turning finally to the most basic form of plural action in 4, I argue that the main problem teamwork models of plural agency have to cope with is that of reconciling the unity of action with the plurality of agents.


BookReader, plural, action : Essays in, philosophy and, social, science

As plural actions require the activity of many, the question of the plural agent arises: who could be so self-confident as to take herself to be doing what requires the activity of many to do? This is to say that intentional self-confidence might well be minimal. 5 Needless to say, the constraints articulated in the principle of intentional self-confidence apply only to intentions, not to wishes and other intentional states. The particular importance of religion is presented by concepts, such as good and evil, morality, ethics, religious laws, purpose and meaning of life, etc. As to the collective agent view (2 it is obvious that many authors are still reluctant to ascribe intentions and actions to collectives. Plural action, contributions TO phenomenology. Second, examples are given for the use of the analysis of collective intentionality in the theory and philosophy of the social sciences (part 2). Mohanty, Temple University, PA, USA. The term is used in much the sense in which it was introduced in Jose Ortega y Gassets hombre y el gente. I furthermore argue that there is a basic fact about collective intentionality that can be learned from Heidegger, which concerns the role of reflective attitudes from the side of the participants.


30 Conventionalism and Its Limits. Philosophy of Social Science 38/1 (2008. Meme theory confronts us with a rather unflattering image of ourselves. Sending a man to the moon belongs to the class of contingently social actions. The extension of the collective agent model is limited to those cases where the distinction between the collective agent on plural action essays in philosophy and social science the one hand and the participating individuals on the other has some intuitive plausibility because this is the way the participating individuals.


Collective Intentionality and, plural

3 The Dogma of Motivational Autarky. That it is possible to interpret their behavior as being their own action. This commitment to the agency of individual persons, Weber seems to think, is incompatible with the assumption that there are any agents other than single individuals, and in particular with the assumptions that there are collective agents. Given their size, they can be rationally self-confident in their ability to do such things. (We are now finally turning to the opposite extreme in the spectrum of the size of plural actions: from the Apollo program to smallest scale everyday cooperation). Needless to say, no part of this volume can make any claim to completeness. Admittedly, this is a somewhat patriarchal notion, and, to say the least, it is not very popular in the current humanities and social sciences. The third chapter approaches a straightforward reading of shared intentionality by challenging yet another implication of most of the received views of collective Introduction xvii intentionality. The epistemological aspect is concerned with the question of knowledge; and the axiological aspect deals with the questions of value. Whereas any singular action can be attributed to a single individual agent the only kind of agent standard theory of action knows of plural actions seem to require a different kind of agent (the plural agent problem). It is not without reason that, after long years of neartotal oblivion, a selection of Lazarus works has recently been published, for upon closer inspection, Lazarus concept of the Volksgeist reveals surprising similarities to current conceptions of social identity. There is a Western Dilemma that sounds like: God or Nature.


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The agency of the other individuals involved in the process is simply bypassed, and their individual contribution remains completely unaccounted for in this view. And it does so only if something like the moon expedition can be described as one action. Is this true, and if so: to what particular kind of action do such things belong? The Greek word is composed of autos, the self, and the verb arkein, to suffice, meaning plural action essays in philosophy and social science self-sufficiency. Thus intention should be conceived of in propositional rather in action-referential terms. If we were to treat collectives as agents, individual agency would be somehow conceptually compromised or impaired. Sometimes, agents have high intentional ambitions, and seriously intend to do things they perfectly well know they might be unable to achieve after all (indeed, such ambitious intentions are common at the start of any project, such. Before looking at possible candidates for this role, however, I should first make sure that this question does indeed make sense. Otherwise, culture and nature will continue to be seen as subjects and objects. Such agents, it seems, need not worry about expecting too much of themselves when they form an intention to carry out a plural action. Vii viii Contents Part II Collective Intentionality in the Social Sciences 5 Social Identities in Experimental Economics.


plural action essays in philosophy and social science

Schlesinger-view of plural agency, but for the sake of brevity, lets stick to the label influence model of plural agency. The fact that not all intentional self-confidence is rational seems to be precisely what makes plural action essays in philosophy and social science the nasa technicians reply in the above anecdote funny. None of these is presupposed or involved in what I call individual intentional autonomy, even though I dare to claim that, conversely, intentional autonomy in the sense defined here is one important presupposition of all of these more ambitious and richer philosophical concepts of autonomy. The principle of intentional self-confidence is a conceptual principle. In brief, motivational autarky is the claim that people cannot act on other peoples wishes without having a volitional agenda of their own. It is as if the leader were taken to be the true agent behind the other participants behavior, which seems incompatible with the view that, in plural actions, all participating individuals are agents in their own right. Chapter 7 is aimed at showing how the views developed in the previous chapter fit into one of the most piercing and powerful critiques of Rational Choice Theory that are available in the received literature, namely the one put forward by Amartya. 7 The Specter of the Group Mind. The Semantics of Shared Emotion, Universitas Philosophica 52: 81106. Contrary to what he expects, the engine starts. I will not delve any deeper into an analysis of intentional self-confidence here, but rather use the principle as a guide to a quite different issue at stake in the anecdote. This is to say that, according to the predominant view, an individual cannot be an agent without being motivationally autarkical.


The breadth and depth of the Series reflects the rich and varied significance of phenomenological thinking for seminal questions of human inquiry as well as the increasingly international reach of phenomenological research. The Rationality of Grief, Inquiry 53(1 2040. According to this view, all participating individuals have a claim on their own individual contribution to the plural action, and no individual has a claim on more than that, so that the plural action as a whole cannot be attributed. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer ScienceBusiness Media (m) Acknowledgements Working on a topic such as the one of this book cannot possibly be a solitary venture. This site is a directory of isbn numbers and book titles. 21 The Principle of Coordination. This is precisely what, in the current literature, the concept of collective intentionality is invoked for: many individuals can intend and claim shared ownership of a plural action insofar as they share the respective intention. Behind this view lies what I propose to label intentional individualism: the view that all intentionality is some individuals. But they cannot simply do what requires the joint forces of many to be done, because this would require that the intentionality of the leader extend directly to the behavior of the subordinates. Rather, I argue that fear of the group mind has done more damage than good to the philosophy of collective intentionality, and that it is time to take a more relaxed stance on the matter. P assumes (with certainty) that the battery of his car is dead. Accordingly, there are two kinds of social actions. Religion is a special form of awareness of the world; the belief in gods or a set of beliefs concerning the origin and purpose of the universe.


Plural action : essays in philosophy and social science / by Hans

The difference is that religion focuses on faith, worship, revelation, and philosophy focuses on the intellectual comprehension. Pdf, txt, ebook Download book Plural action : essays in philosophy and social science / by Hans Bernhard Schmid. I argue, however, that in such cases, the agent must take himself to have a chance at success, however minimal, which might be in conflict with his conscious assessment of the situation. 14 Individualism About Feelings. Plural actions are either ascribed to collective agents (such as in the case of Parliament being ascribed the action of passing a law or to influential individuals (such as in the case of Caesars being credited with defeating. Since, in everyday life, we often seem to have no difficulty whatsoever in ascribing intentions and actions to collectives, however, one might wonder what reason Weber might have had for this claim.


Collective Emotion and the Function of Expressive Behaviour

Pure coordination, re-labeled, complete set of strategies. 257 List of Figures.1 Taxonomy of action types. There is no reason why action theory should treat conceptions of collective agency with so much reserve. Links: Disclaimer: ebookee is a search engine of ebooks on the Internet ( 4shared Mediafire Rapidshare ) and does not upload or store any files on its server. 2 Collective Agents and Individual Autonomy 11 What is the reason for Webers view? The first chapter sets the stage by introducing the concept of plural action. To do this, he must have some knowledge of values in their own context, that is, in moral and social philosophy. In a Tardean view, our role in cultural evolution is neither that of a completely sovereign subject, nor that of a mere meme vehicle. Therefore, the remaining two candidates proposed for the role of a plural agent by ordinary language need to be examined. The only reason why social science cannot fully do away with collectivity concepts on the lowest level is, according to Weber, that collectivities are part of the content of individual intentional mental states. Physical Description: xxiii, 260. Philosophy of Sociology: Any science has a philosophy of its own in the sense it is committed to acquire knowledge relevant to its field in its own legitimate ways.


The behavior has to be minimally rational,.e. Please note you've to add our email to approved e-mail addresses. Earlier versions or parts of the chapters in this book have appeared in the following journals and collected volumes (by chapter number. Not so many facts known about this dilemma, but in his work, Oliver Simon plural action essays in philosophy and social science argues that the modern culture-nature divide is bound to collapse, because of the relentless expansion of technology into culture and nature. Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University, FL, USA. Groups have a sort of agency of their own based on the participating individuals insight into the problems of aggregating individual decisions to collective decisions, and on the participating individuals choice to get their collective act together in avoiding. The basis of religion is the faith and the basis of philosophy is the thought and knowledge. For any other type of agency would displace the participating individuals agency. At the same time, philosophy works together with both, science and religion. 36 The Memes Eye View.


That the interpretation of each individuals behavior has to bottom out in his or her own volitions or pro-attitudes (rather than in some other individuals volitions or pro-attitudes). The proposed solution concerns the other side of the paradox,.e. 4 This claim is often ascribed to Paul Grice (1971) and. In plural action essays in philosophy and social science Heideggers analysis, there is a tendency to associate the public sphere with what he calls inauthenticity. Upon another persons request, he turns the ignition key. In this chapter, I focus on the xxii Introduction most infamous of all conceptions of the collective mind, the Volksgeist.


Essay on Relationship Between Sociology and Philosophy

The first chapter of this concluding part starts out with an analysis of what has often been perceived as the main problem in Martin Heideggers Being and Time. 35 Lazarus Volksgeist: Some Problems. Introduction xxi another solution to the problem instead. 40 The Problem of Interaction. The chapter comes in three sections. 3 The Dogma of Motivational Autarky The second type of answer to the whodunit question concerning plural agency is this: those individuals who were in control of the project (according to its institutional structure) did. If this happens by chance or due to unusual and unforeseeable circumstances, this does not render ones intentional self-confidence irrational.) Conversely, intentional self-confidence is subjectively irrational if one fails to form an intention to do something one. There are collectives, because people think there are collectives, and not the other way around. So how, then, can the unity of action plural action essays in philosophy and social science be reconciled with the plurality of agents without scratching the principle of individual intentional autonomy? A straightforward, non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality is not bound to end up in a collectivist conception of the mind that violates our basic assumption of intentional autonomy.


The Relationship Between Religion Philosophy And Science Philosophy Essay

Religion has a cult that is not present in philosophy, so there are a lot of contradictions between religion and philosophy. Dermot Moran, plural action essays in philosophy and social science University College Dublin, Ireland. Among its advantages, however, is the fact that it is deeply rooted in everyday talk. On Not Doing Ones Part: Dissidence and the Normativity of Collective Intention. Let us therefore turn to the remaining two common-sense replies to the question of plural agency. Overcoming the Cartesian Brainwash: Beyond Intentional Individualism. Here, it is assumed that when people share an intention, each of them has his or her own intention, but that these individual intentions are of the same type (and perhaps accompanied by some reciprocal cognitive attitudes).


Macrocognition: Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. Moreover, some forms of motivational heterarky are compatible with intentional autonomy. It is always possible to do what the other wants, but if one does so, either of the following has to be the case: one has come to want it oneself, or one has some other appropriate pro-attitude. But who can possibly fit that bill? Part III Engaging the Classics: Four Critical Readings 9 Martin Heidegger and the Cartesian Brainwash: Towards a Non-individualistic Account of Dasein. It is characteristic of much of this debate that small-scale examples are used to discuss the structure of plural action. As some considerations concerning the ontology of memes (which I shall present in the second step) reveal, there are fundamental differences between this view of genes and that of memes which cannot be accounted for within the memetic view. These are social actions, because they require cooperation, and they are plural actions exactly insofar as the helpers goal is the same as the individuals who is being helped (i.e. The other participants would be quite literally reduced to the leaders hands, feet, and other limbs: the behavior (body) being the subordinates, the intentionality (mind) being the leaders. I propose the term plural action for the kind of action in question. This, however, seems to preclude the possibility of many agents performing one and the same (token) action: if As action and Bs action are the same, A performs Bs action. Some philosophers have claimed that there is a contradiction built into the very notion of altruistic action: our standard theory of action implies some degree of selfishness, which is at odds with our intuitive concept of genuine altruism.


Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement in the Expression of Emotions, in Rorty, (ed.) Explaining Emotions. The reasoning behind this thesis seems to be the following: if the intentional interpretation of individual As behavior were to bottom out in some of individual Bs pro-attitudes rather than in any of As own (other-directed) pro-attitudes,. In the first step, the image of the self as a meme nest is traced back to its neo-Darwinian origins. London: Routledge 2006,. Most philosophers of collective intentionality, however, are very reluctant to admit a straightforward understanding of the sharedness of intentional states.